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ABSTRACT 
This paper explores issues of security, privacy and liberty arising in relation to ICT supported emergency 
management. The aim is to inform the design of emergency management information systems (EMIS) and 
architectures that support emergent interoperability and assembly of emergency management systems of 
systems. We show how transformations of social and material practices of privacy boundary management create 
challenges, opportunities and dangers in this context. While opportunities include development of more efficient 
and agile emergency management models, building on smart city concepts, dangers include surveillance, social 
sorting and an erosion of civil liberties. Against this backdrop, we briefly explore human practice focused 
‘privacy by design’ as a candidate design avenue.  
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INTRODUCTION 
Three trends in contemporary societies make privacy protection an important issue in the design of Emergency 
Management Information Systems (EMIS) (Turoff, Chumer, Van De Walle, & Yao, 2003; Van De Walle, 
Turoff, & Hiltz, 2010; Van De Walle & Turoff, 2007):  
• Calls for greater interoperability – inspired by recurring experiences of difficulties of communication, 
coordination and collaboration in disaster response, and also including calls for support for the assembly of 
flexible ‘systems of systems’ for emergency response (US Department of Homeland Security, 2004) 
• A digital ‘tsunami’ – a term coined by an EU Commission ‘Future Group’, who observe how people and 
objects can be mapped, tracked and interrogated for commercial, social, and security purposes; how 
individuals contribute data through self-disclosure, e.g. in social media, and how advances in data 
processing make this ‘tsunami’ of personal data amenable to potent analysis (Future Group, 2007). 
• Fear of ‘big brother’ surveillance – fuelled by increasing awareness and unease with privacy intrusion and 
personal data processing and surveillance. 
Together, these three trends create a complex landscape of incentives, opportunities and challenges for EMIS 
innovation. Faced with life-threatening circumstances, many people would regard a loss of privacy a small price 
to pay for swift assistance. To speed up search and rescue, or to contain the spread of infectious diseases, 
personal information such as location and names would clearly be useful (and obtainable even from turned off 
mobile phones, if telecommunications operators share their data (Bengtsson, Lu, Thorson, Garfield, & Schreeb, 
2011). To receive the most appropriate medical care, interoperability with medical records and data from 
biosensors or implants (such as wireless pacemakers) could be helpful; and to help responders contact family or 
friends, mobile phone or social media data could be consulted. Personal data can also play an important role in 
prevention, planning, and recovery phases. For example, surveillance of suspects may help prevent crime, 
knowledge about persons most vulnerable (e.g. the elderly, chronically ill, or families with young children) may 
help emergency response agencies tailor warnings, advice and support to the specific needs of such populations, 
and access to households’ purchasing records could speed up compensation during recovery. 
Advanced information and communication technologies (ICT) have the potential to enhance personal data 
processing capabilities for emergency response, aiding the development of better, more efficient and economical 
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services. EMIS try to leverage this potential. However, how societies, institutions and organizations handle, and 
how individuals can control, personal data are highly consequential matters, deeply entangling security, privacy 
and liberty with technological potential. Data protection laws, legal risk analysis, privacy protection practices, 
policies and technologies are being developed to manage risks and opportunities for individuals, groups, and 
society as well as professional responders. In this paper we provide an overview of issues to inform the design 
of EMIS and architectures that support assembly of ‘systems of systems’ for ‘agile’ emergency response. 
TRANSFORMATIONS OF PRIVACY 
Traditional definitions of privacy describe it as a state of social withdrawal or the right to be ‘left alone’ 
(Brandeis & Warren, 1890). Over a decade ago, Scott McNealy, then CEO for CISCO, argued that ‘You already 
have zero privacy, get over it’ (cited in Langheinrich, 2001), observing that citizens behave in contradictory 
ways – on the one hand seemingly carelessly sharing personal information, on the other worried about an 
erosion of privacy. However, privacy is not just a state of withdrawal, but a contextual, situated, practically 
achieved matter of boundary management (Altman, 1976; Nissenbaum, 2009; Palen & Dourish, 2003). People 
modulate the disclosure of personal information dependent on the context, controlling it through embodied 
conduct embedded in material environments, through providing or withholding of information in relations with 
organizations such as healthcare providers, local authorities, or telecommunications operators, through 
agreements with data controllers, and through freedom of information requests about the data that is held about 
one’s person. Palen and Dourish (2003) observe three key boundaries for privacy management: 
• Privacy and publicity: By managing disclosure and giving out only ‘enough’ information to relevant 
social groups, a boundary between private and public can be maintained. However, not all disclosure is 
conscious and not all information can be withheld (e.g. gender, age). 
• Identity/Role: Privacy debates often assume that people are primarily concerned about privacy as 
individuals. However, in most situations, people are social actors and present different aspects of their 
identity in different social contexts. Emergency responders, for example, act as representatives of 
institutions. Control over personal data in different roles is important. 
• Time/Space: The capability of information technology to transmit and preserve information changes the 
spatial and temporal ‘reach’ of information. This creates tension for the control of privacy because how 
information is going to be used in other places and in the future cannot always be anticipated.  
Over the last decade, new areas for privacy boundary management have emerged, most importantly: 
• Movement: Smartphones and social network technologies allow friends and family to see where one is, 
and new uses of database technology complicate selective disclosure of location information (De Souza 
E Silva & Frith, 2010). For example, US-European counter terrorism collaboration agreements allow 
US intelligence agencies to examine European air passenger records (Williams, 2012). 
• Social networks: The documentation of social connections in social media can enhance search engines 
with ‘social search’ (Sherrets, 2008). This introduces a need for ‘social privacy’.  
People have developed sophisticated practices of modulating privacy along these boundaries in low-tech, co-
present situations, but these practices are based on the ability to understand how one’s person is situated and 
visible in space, time, and in relation to other individuals, groups or organizations. New technologies have 
engendered a ‘steady erosion of clearly situated action’ (Grudin 2001, cited in Palen & Dourish, 2003) altering 
‘our control over how disclosed information is interpreted in different contexts and times’, through:  
• High-speed transmission – Data can be sent at very high speeds (up to 26 terabits per second1). 
• Persistence – Data stored digitally can be stored in very large volumes and for very long times. 
• Enhanced computation – Abilities of search, triangulation, actuarial analytics, visualizing data and 
other forms of computation enable sophisticated processing of huge data volumes. 
• Disembodiment – The production of and access to personal data are increasingly disembodied. The 
immateriality of digital information and networks makes it possible for people to generate data without 
noticing it and for others to access and process such information without their subjects noticing it.  
• Dissociation – Dissociation happens when the results of actions are visible, but the actions that led to 
them are invisible; in other words, when one cannot easily determine who is doing, or did, what. 
(Bellotti and Sellen, 1993). 
                                                            
1 http://www.gizmag.com/record-26-terabits-per-second-data-transmission/18702/  
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• Addressability – A range of generalized and standardized grids and metrics make people and objects 
increasingly locatable, creating ‘a global architecture of address’, where ‘each and every part of the 
world could in theory be given an address’ (Thrift, 2007). GIS and GPS support this (Crang and 
Graham, 2007, Graham, 2009, Thrift, 2004), and Internet protocol version 6 (IPv6) makes 
comprehensive addressability an even more realistic prospect.  
For crisis management, ideas of an ‘internet of things’ (Mattern and Floerkemeier, 2010) helps to locate objects 
and resources, as well as people who may be trapped or moving away from the scene open up new opportunities 
for better, more effective and economical disaster management. But the fact that these capabilities are also 
problematic, because they can obstruct lived practices of privacy boundary management, must be addressed 
through design, ideally enhancing people’s abilities to: 
• notice instances of data collection, 
• determine who might be looking and why  
• comprehend the spatial, temporal, social and political contexts, 
• negotiate and agree proportionate and appropriate practices and  
• be sure that such agreements are adhered to and, if necessary, enforce them 
To support the practices involved in this, privacy sensitive emergency management technology design needs to 
shift the focus from merely regulating and monitoring ‘access’ to personal data to supporting diverse 
stakeholders in managing privacy boundaries – emergency responders, public authorities, the individuals and 
communities affected by disasters, as well as members of the general public. Such support should also allow 
people to notice potentially complex value conflicts, to determine and negotiate the proportionality and 
legitimacy of data processing, to actively trust (or withdraw trust) from data controllers and agree a level of 
granularity of personal data that is appropriate to the situation.  
CHALLENGES, OPPORTUNITIES, DANGERS 
To inform debate about how such support may be developed in and for EMIS, we now review some key 
challenges, opportunities and dangers that arise from lack of support for privacy management, embedding 
concerns about privacy in wider consideration of ethical and social issues, focussing on the European Union. 
Challenges: Failure to share data, legitimacy and silo-thinking 
Experience of the practicalities of data protection in multi-agency emergency response actually highlights 
failure to share data as a serious challenge. Reflecting on evaluations of the emergency response effort after the 
London 7/7 bombings in 2005, Hilary Armstrong, UK Cabinet Minister for Social Exclusion, for example, 
points out that: 
It was apparent that in some parts of the emergency response, the requirements of the Data Protection 
Act 1998 were either misinterpreted or over-zealously applied. Subsequent reports … have indicated that 
the London experience in this respect is not unique. (Armstrong, Ashton, & Thomas, 2007) 
In 2005, failures to share data amongst the emergency agencies led to inefficiencies and mistakes so significant 
that the UK Government was prompted to clarify the data protection laws and formulate this specific ‘Data 
Protection and Sharing Guidance for Emergency Planners and Responders’. For example, data controllers 
considered that it was not legal to pass personal data initially collected from victims by the Family Assistance 
Centre on to successor organizations for follow-up support. This complicated continuity of care for people at a 
very sensitive time. Such fragmentation of response efforts constitutes an example of ‘silo-thinking’, or a lack of 
organizational interoperability, where individual agencies do not collaborate even where this would be useful 
and possible. The problems are well-known in other countries. Indeed Cole (2010) cites studies where 
professionals identify ‘silo-thinking’ as one of the main barriers to organisational interaction.  
Opportunities: Systems of systems for agile response 
At the same time, transformations of privacy practices allow emergency responders to develop new, more 
efficient forms of communication, coordination and collaboration. Systems of systems approaches that allow 
flexible assembly and coordination of relevant services, organizations, information sources and resources at 
system runtime are gaining ground. In the US Department of Homeland Security’s definition: 
A system of systems exists when a group of independently operating systems—comprised of people, 
technology, and organizations—are connected, enabling emergency responders to effectively support 
day-to-day operations, planned events, or major incidents. (US Dept. for Homeland Security, 2004: 1) 
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In the European context, where the emphasis is strongly on ‘unity in diversity’, the centralization and 
standardization that drive US efforts are complemented with a subsidiarity principle of devolving decision-
making to the lowest possible level (whilst supporting coordinative action at a higher level). This requires 
support for the situated assembly of appropriate ‘adhocracies’ and improvisation, a focus on ‘emergent 
interoperability’ (Mendonça, Jefferson, & Harrald, 2007).  
Ideas of emergent interoperability, that is, an ability to connect systems on the fly, based on standard protocols 
and/or mechanisms of wrapping and translation, open up new capabilities to enhance security for citizens 
through more flexible use of data. New forms of interoperability can enable more ‘agile response’, that is, more 
richly and dynamically informed collaboration. The concept of agile response describes a flexible, loosely 
coupled, but highly collaborative response effort, where people have a high and highly distributed real-time 
degree of awareness of activities and resources and are able to mobilize these effectively in a coordinated 
manner (Harrald, 2006). The concept builds on visions of ‘smart cities’ that enable integration of different 
services, from healthcare to transport management, to insurance, taxation and e-government. There are a number 
of examples worldwide where such integration across civil, commercial and public safety services is gaining 
ground. Rio De Janeiro, for example, facilitates collaboration between routine transportation management and 
crisis management (Naphade, Banavar, Harrison, Paraszczak, & Morris, 2011). Other countries, like Japan, are 
implementing visions of ‘the future resilient society’ through integration of personal data across municipal, 
commercial, executive and juridical fields of everyday life (Maeda, 2010) (Figure 1).  
 
Figure 1 ‘Next generation ICT services for the resilient society’ (adapted from Maeda 2010) 
While such interoperability could be powerful for beneficial purposes, the digital tsunami it rides on can also 
foster the development of a technological and bureaucratic apparatus for all encompassing surveillance. The 
latter is not an inevitable consequence of pursuing the former, but to define avenues for design, it is important to 
discuss key dangers in some depth.  
Dangers: Surveillance, social sorting, and an erosion of civil liberties  
Recent debates about ‘Safeguarding Privacy in a connected world’ (European Commission, 2012) index 
citizen’s fears over surveillance. They show that current privacy protection is flawed, undermining well-meant 
efforts to utilise intelligence to enhance efficiency and security within European societies. Landmark new data 
protection regulations are being drawn up to take account of technological advances and to address key issues in 
the processing of personal data, particularly conditions of consent, transparency, data access for data subjects, 
rights to rectification and erasure, the right to object and the right not to be subject to profiling, obligations of 
data controllers, and exceptions to the fundamental right to personal data protection (EU Commission, 2012).  
It is critical for designers of EMIS to address these issues. If regulators, citizens or professionals are worried 
about privacy, they will not (allow) use of new technologies even if they could enhance emergency services. 
Perhaps even more worryingly, technologies may be used in ways that extend surveillance unnecessarily. But to 
address issues of privacy, security and liberty a deeper understanding of experiences and practices and their 
implications is needed. The dangers are not easy to circumscribe, they are often hidden and complex. The text in 
this section seeks to fathom some of the most important, starting with surveillance, exclusionary forms of 
control, social sorting, false positives, an erosion of freedoms, actuarial justice, retrospective accountability, 
cultures of fear, and a militarization of emergency response.  
With an ever more extensive use of ever more powerful databases, some analysts argue: 
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… a new Faustian bargain was struck around 1990. … [In a] ‘dance with the digital’ … [which is] 
making public through databasing what had been private … many elements of economic and social life 
are ‘locked in’ to a path dependent pattern, more of a spider’s web than web 2.0. (Urry, 2007:275) 
For Urry, who considers these matters in the context of increasing conflicts over resource shortages (water, soil, 
oil, finance) and climate change, societies face a choice between all-encompassing surveillance and disastrous 
chaos as global futures are ‘poised between an Orwellian or Hobbesian future’ (ibid: 290).  
The bargain is Faustian, because choices about these futures are often implicit, folded into everyday life. The 
ways in which people and organizations appropriate new technologies, for example, increasingly hybridize 
public and private aspects of life (Sheller & Urry, 2003). People may, for example, engage in private 
communications in public spaces, and such communications may be monitored; they have networked medical 
devices (such as pacemakers) implanted into their bodies, inhabit homes or workspace that are open to scrutiny 
by others, for example, through assisted living technologies, or media-space technologies. Sherry Turkle states: 
we live a life that generates its own electronic shadow. Over time, most people find a way to ignore or 
deny it. … particularly for those who have grown up in our new regime of surveillance, leaving an 
electronic trace can come to feel so natural that the shadow seems to disappear. (Turkle, 2011) 
This naturalized, invisible regime of surveillance has corrosive potential. Michel Foucault, a historian and 
philosopher who explored technologically augmented disciplinary rationalities, shows how individuals whose 
private lives may be scrutinized by authorities are likely to internalize control into their very body and soul 
(Foucault, 1977). Foucault makes an important distinction between inclusionary and exclusionary discipline that 
is helpful in relation to EMIS design. Inclusionary discipline occurred, for example, during the 17th Century 
plague pandemic, a point of origin for innovation in personal data processing. New forms of census registered 
people in their homes, recorded their name and health status. This allowed the authorities to know about deaths, 
to collect and remove the dead and to train people to deal with the disease. In the process, ‘docile’ citizens 
emerged that would subject themselves, if not willingly, quietly to surveillance and crisis management 
measures. This was inclusionary, because those subject to surveillance remained inside society and became part 
of the management of the crisis. The treatment of leprosy – a more creeping crisis – was very different. It 
implied identification, then separation and often permanent exile from society, a form of exclusionary discipline 
that is one of the points of origin for the exclusionary power of digital profiling techniques that analysts 
highlight today, where social sorting, categorical exclusion and false positives are critical issues. 
Clive Norris’ analysis (2002) explains these dangers and their relevance to ICT supported emergency response 
by mapping Foucault’s analysis onto a discussion of how digital surveillance fosters an exclusionary digital 
disciplinary society. He shows how powerful  ‘next generation’ ICT are able to combine, for example, CCTV, 
facial recognition analytics, automatic number plate recognition (ANPR) and policing databases. If personal 
data are stored across such landscapes of interoperable data repositories for commerce, transport, education, 
administration and crisis response, information about deviance can be searched and stored. It becomes possible 
to exclude certain groups of people from certain spaces and services. Populations may be diverted and denied 
access to some services in ‘sentient cities’, perhaps even without their noticing (Crang & Graham, 2007)(see 
also Adey, 2009 for an account of preemptive securitization and the body). 
Individuals may be subject to surreptitious capture of personal data, for example through face recognition and 
behavioural biometrics. A critical danger here is that individuals may become ‘false positives’, that is, falsely 
identified as a target for action (or refusal of service). This is a particularly strong risk during and after 
emergency situations. For example, in their investigations into a thwarted bombing attack shortly after the 2005 
7/7 London bombings, the UK police incorrectly identified Jean Charles de Menezes as Hussain Osman, one of 
the organisers of the attack. This eventually led to Mr de Menezes being shot dead. More broadly, particular 
groups within society may be discriminated against due to technologically augmented capabilities to carry out 
‘social sorting’, that is, categorization based on criteria such as ethnicity, age, gender, health status but also 
more flexible ‘markers’ across different data sets. For example, in 2009 in the UK, ‘protester’ markers were 
accumulated and connected to vehicles and their owners which were then entered into national ANPR-based 
transport monitoring systems, which led to peaceful protesters being searched and obstructed. This endangers 
freedoms of association and also constitutes an instance of ‘function creep’, that is, the reuse of data collected 
for one purpose for another, unrelated purpose.  
Function creep is a danger that can be significantly exacerbated by innovation in EMIS and design for emergent 
interoperability, because when combined with exceptions to normal data protection rules granted under 
conditions of emergency, these new technologies can open new doors for repurposing personal data. Actuarial 
analytics that originate from the insurance sector have, for example, been introduced to policing (Feeley and 
Simon, 1994), where they have ‘become at least as important as reactive penal measures’ (Zedner, 2007: 265). 
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Actuarial analysis is problematic, because it allows social sorting and categorical exclusion, which ‘eschews 
corrective aspirations, takes crime and deviance for granted, and seeks technical means and measures to manage 
the threat they represent’ (Yar, 2003: 256). Austerity and increased occurrence of crises that stretch response 
capacity exert pressure to utilize such preventative, actuarial, exclusionary measures. Solove (2004) argues that 
in the light of such techniques, traditional metaphors of surveillance (such as Big Brother) could usefully be 
elaborated through Kafka’s novel The Trial (Kafka, 2000), a novel that chronicles feelings of exclusion, 
helplessness and frustration in relation to disembodied, dissociated surveillance and profiling, done with unclear 
accountability and little control on the individual’s part over the gathering, processing and storing of data.  
Automated data analysis has the potential to be particularly pernicious. It draws on data collected from different 
sources which may contain missing or obsolete data. If data cleaning is not conducted properly, mistakes – e.g. 
false positives (locating a trapped victim where there is none, or branding an innocent person as a terrorist 
suspect, as in the de Menezes case) – can occur. With a false positive rate of 1%, which is as low as statistical 
inference can normally be, the American Computer Assisted Passenger Prescreening System might scrutinize 
the 1.8 million that travel by air in the US and mark 18,000 innocent people as suspects every day (Solove, 
2008). Also, processing might not accurately distinguish noise from important information, leading to false 
negatives, that is, failing to identify relevant instances (such as a healthy trapped victim or a criminal). These are 
serious concerns that seriously challenge arguments of ‘if you have nothing to hide, you need not worry about 
surveillance’, which are voiced frequently in debates about privacy protection.  
The new temporality of privacy creates further tensions. The default when designing ICT for emergency 
management is to keep records as detailed and as lasting as possible, including records of actions and decisions 
taken by emergency response professionals and experts. This thinking complicates embodied control of personal 
information and privacy management (Bannon, 2006; Dodge & Kitchin, 2007). The unforgetting accumulation 
of data can, for example, allow inappropriate retrospective scrutiny of decisions and actions. The verdict in the 
l’Aquila trial in 2012, where six scientists and an official of Italy’s Civil Protection Agency were convicted of 
manslaughter for providing false reassurances to the public regarding the earthquake, is an extreme example of 
how the ability of tracking who said what when may affect the accountability of emergency responders2. 
Widening our perspective yet further, for societies, the collection and processing of personal data may become 
problematic because basic rights, such as freedoms of speech, association and movement can be eroded. 
Contemporary constructions of risk and danger, especially since the start of the ‘war on terror’ after 9/11, may 
be leading societies into a permanent state of emergency/exception. A potent driver is the transformation of fear, 
which, according to sociologist Frank Furedi: ‘is no longer simply an emotion, or a response to the perception 
of threat. It has become a cultural idiom …. Popular culture continually encourages an expansive alarmist 
imagination’ (Furedi, 2006). Fearful societies have begun to accept, or even call for, a far-reaching 
securitization, even ‘militarization of everyday life’ (Graham, 2010), that is, an embedding of security/military 
perspectives and technologies into of everyday spaces and everyday lives, from all-surround CCTV to the use of 
blast proof concrete in buildings. EMIS, too, are embracing military inspired technologies, such as incident 
command system (ICS) structures and GPS. The embedding of military technologies into everyday life and ICT 
has a long history, from the Internet to GPS. However, recent years have seen an acceleration, as technology 
companies bound up with the military begin to sell to civilian and public authority users, and create new 
products that are no longer purely military or purely civilian (Wood, Ball, Lyon, Norris, & Raab, 2006). 
Pressures of shrinking military budgets no doubt fuel some of this doubling, or re-orientation. But integration of 
military metaphors and technologies into emergency response is a delicate enterprise. They can deeply and 
detrimentally affect the way in which emergency management is done: The centralization of emergency 
response under the Department of Homeland Security in the US after 9/11, for example, played a significant part 
in the failure of humanitarian response to Katrina (Birkland, 2009; see also Tierney, 2006).  
A militarization of emergency response and everyday culture also contributes to what Giorgio Agamben 
describes as a spread of exceptions, often declared to protect national security (Agamben, 2005), where 
fundamental human rights can be suspended. Agamben’s argument is complex and it is beyond the scope of this 
paper to explore it in detail (readers may find elaboration in (Scheuerman, 2006)). Most importantly, the 
extension of exceptions is exacerbated by increasing emergent interoperability between existing information 
systems, EMIS through novel architectures that connect them, e.g. into smart city databases. European history is 
marked by the devastating experience of two world wars, and the holocaust, which was facilitated by an 
unprecedentedly effective process of collecting, sharing and processing personal data through an efficient 
                                                            
2 The verdict contrasts starkly with juridical inertia in relation to a company that was found to have rebuilt 
antiseismic apartments, using substandard seismic isolators, rendering new buildings vulnerable to future 
earthquakes. See Jones, T. (2012). Short Cuts. London Review. 
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bureaucratic apparatus and culture of surveillance (Arendt, 2004; Bauman, 1989). Totalitarian rule was 
established in no small part through the evocation of a series of extra-legal ‘states of exception’, which 
suspended data protection laws, because it was assumed that ‘the rule of law may prevent a [state] from 
defending itself’ (Scheppele, 2003: 1010). This experience demonstrates that suspension of fundamental human 
rights and a softening of separations between data controllers can have severe consequences for societies. These 
experiences colour much of the political response to the ‘war on terror’: 
…much of the international community … has turned away from these extra-legal justifications for states  
of exception. … Only the United States, with its eighteenth century constitution and Cold War legacy of 
exceptionalism, seems to be soldiering on in this new legal space of conflict (Scheppele 2003: 1082) 
But US philosophies of extra-legal exceptionalism, where the power to define exceptions is concentrated in the 
hands of individuals, inform the design of information systems with ever more permeable boundaries between 
data controllers, persistent storage, and powerful analytic and visualizing capacities, EMIS, smart city systems 
and supporting architectures, are examples. A key issue here is the removal of boundaries that separate criminal 
investigations from national security investigations. For example, in the UK calls for ‘smart city’ convergence 
between Transport for London and police systems, and the extension of the ANPR system’s use from 
congestion charging to policing related to national security as well as investigations for general criminal 
policing echo controversies around the US Patriot Act, aimed at ‘Uniting and Strengthening America by 
Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism’3. The Act was passed in 2001, and it 
enables extensive processing of personal data, including records of commercial transactions and Passenger 
Name Records collected in third countries, such as European member states (Whittaker, 2011). 
These dangers are, in part, allowed to coalesce, because citizens do not ‘feel’ the intrusion into their privacy. 
Pre-emptive measures are often localised, unplanned, enabled by invisible infrastructure and powered by 
blackboxed interoperability between systems. Genuine and imagined threats and austerity economic pressures 
on the provision of emergency services seem to require the maximization of data sharing. Thus the advance of 
surveillance is creeping, disembodied, invisible and passive, and rationalized by hopeful discourses of enhanced 
efficiency and fearful discourses of security. Our summary of dangers suggests that such advances have the 
potential to erode democratic citizenship and civil liberties, but it also charts opportunities for intervention 
through circumspect design and innovative appropriation of EMIS, which we will now consider briefly.  
PRIVACY BY DESIGN FOR EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT INFORMATION SYSTEMS OF SYSTEMS 
Privacy sensitive agile emergency response is a hopeful vision. Realizing it without breaking fundamental 
freedoms is a challenging balancing act for design. It is beyond the scope of this paper to resolve the dangers we 
have explored, but in this section we seek to contribute to larger efforts, by discussing ‘privacy by design’ as a 
particularly promising avenue for innovation.  
Privacy by design is a relatively new approach and it has several meanings and origins (Cavoukian, 2001; 
Langheinrich, 2001). Firstly, privacy by design is about heightening sensitivity to privacy issues during design. 
Secondly, it can be about enforcing compliance with privacy regulations through hard wiring constraints on 
practices into design with privacy enhancing technologies (PETs). Existing examples include privacy policy 
inspection, access control restriction, and pseudonymisation tools that allow people to maintain a degree of 
anonymity (Pearson, 2009). Both approaches need to be supplemented with methods that support translation 
into the design and appropriation of technologies. Such methodologies may include privacy and ethical impact 
assessments, that is, structured investigations into the privacy and ethical implications of design decisions 
(Clarke, 2009; Wright, 2010), and legal risk analysis. All should “begin at the earliest possible stages, when 
there are still opportunities to influence the outcome of a project” (Wright & DeHeert, 2012). In our own work, 
we combine these with more qualitative ethnographic and participatory design approaches that explore privacy 
and ethical issues through observation, collaborative design and iterative experimental implementation (Ramirez 
and Buscher, 2012). This is motivated by the contextual, practiced nature of privacy boundary management, 
which requires that designers understand and anticipate how technologies might be used effectively as an 
integral part such (changing) practices. 
                                                            
3 Such calls were part of the current Mayor of London’s re-­‐election manifesto: “Ensuring strong protections 
against misuse, I will extend this approach	  [ANPR	  for	  fighting	  crime]	  by	  requiring	  Transport	  for	  London	  and	  
The	  Metropolitan	  Police	  service	  to	  assume	  joint	  responsibility	   for	  TfL’s	  ANPR	  camera	  system	  which	   is	  used	  
for	  the	  operation	  of	  the	  congestion	  charge	  and	  the	  low	  emission	  zone.	  This	  would	  give	  the	  Met	  [Metropolitan	  Police	   Service]	   straightforward	   access,	   with	   an	   explicit	   purpose	   of	   crime	   prevention	   and	   detection”	  (http://www.scribd.com/doc/91943852/Taking-­‐Greater-­‐London-­‐Forward,	  Accessed	  July	  2012) 
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This approach has shown that inscribing compliance into technologies is less useful in EMIS design, in view of 
the dynamic nature of emergency management and the need for emergent interoperability in systems of systems 
approaches. Privacy cannot easily usefully be ensured or ‘enforced’ apriori by design in this context. However, 
our qualitative studies and experimental engagement with stakeholders have also highlighted a third approach of 
human-practice focused privacy by design. This is based on a shift from conceptions of privacy as a value that 
has to be traded in in return for security, or a right that has to be enforced through rigid regulation, to an 
understanding of privacy as a contextual value and embodied practice that is augmented and constrained by 
technologies, cultural conventions and the law. By taking this perspective, alternative design avenues are opened 
up, for example via specification of non-functional requirements such as architectural qualities of transparency 
and inspectability. For example, privacy protection in emergency response systems of systems may be supported 
by imposing temporal and geographical constraints on data sharing. Our research suggests that a human practice 
focused approach is particularly useful for EMIS design in view of the substantive ethical and legal challenges.  
When, in times of crises, boundaries between different systems (telecoms databases, transport management 
systems, police records, social networking systems, insurance databases) are made permeable, allowing 
automated data collection, data mining, analysis and profiling, conventional privacy protection that involves 
limiting access at the point of data collection, including using legal, cryptographic and statistical techniques is 
likely to be prohibitively rigid and restrictive. Accountable datamining, an approach developed in response to 
the fact that the Internet provides a huge source of data that can render conventional access-limiting methods 
ineffective and impractical, is an example of innovative privacy solutions that may be useful in a human practice 
focused approach. Referring to the US use of data mining around Passenger Records, (Weitzner et al., 2008) 
argue that: ‘Laws that limit access to information do not protect privacy here because so much of the data is 
publicly available. To date, neither law nor technology has developed a way to address this privacy loophole.’ 
New socio-technical mechanisms are required and Weitzner and his colleagues suggest: 
• transparency: mechanisms where the history of data manipulations and inferences is maintained and 
can be examined by authorized parties (who may be the general public) 
• accountability: one can check whether policies that govern data processing were in fact adhered to 
(Weitzner et al., 2006)  
In the context of emergency response violations of data protection regulations may be necessary and legitimate. 
Personal data may be used for purposes other than those specified at the time of collection. To support trust in 
systems that support interoperability in times of crisis (but not under normal circumstances), the design of tools 
that make use of personal data accountable at the time of use and retrospectively seems promising. Weitzner et 
al (2006) introduce three mechanisms to maintain accountability when performing data mining:  
• Inferencing Engine(s) that support analysis of data and assesses compliance with relevant rules  
• A Truth Maintenance System based on a persistent store fed by inference engines checking data 
accuracy as well as data provenance, and reliability of inferences  
• A Proof Generator that constructs proofs that critical transitions and unplanned uses of 
personal information are justified by facts and permissible under applicable rules 
This form of privacy protection aims to protect privacy from three directions: (1) by controlling access, (2) by 
supporting reference to pre-defined rules and (3) by making the justification of inferences trace-able. The 
transparency and accountability gained is useful for a human practice focused approach, because it can augment 
practices of utilizing interoperable data stores in times of crisis, whilst supporting awareness of rules and 
accountability of breaching such rules.  
CONCLUSION  
The main contribution of this paper is a discussion of key challenges, opportunities and dangers of utilizing 
personal data for emergency management. We argue that it is important to translate enhanced privacy sensitivity 
into design and have highlighted privacy by design as a promising avenue for design. In conclusion, our 
investigation suggests that while compliance with values of privacy can, in some instances, be designed ‘into’ 
technology, in the dynamic context of crisis management, where flexibility is needed with regard to what kinds 
of information sources can be used and how, an approach that seeks to design for privacy in the sense of 
supporting professional responders as well as other stakeholders and the public in noticing, negotiating and 
managing privacy is a more effective and useful approach. 
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